Thursday, December 13, 2018

Monday, April 23, 2018

SANS Blue Team Summit


Here is a copy of my SANS Blue Team Summit talk Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

Tuesday, April 03, 2018

Friday, September 22, 2017

DerbyCon 7: DeepBlueCLIv2 Talk and links

Here's a link to my DerbyCon 7 talk: Introducing DeepBlueCLI v2, Now Available in PowerShell and Python

Last year's talk: http://www.ericconrad.com/2016/09/deepbluecli-powershell-module-for-hunt.html

 DeepBlueCLIv2

References:
  1. Deconstructing Petya: how it spreads and how to fight back, https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2017/06/28/deconstructing-petya-how-it-spreads-and-how-to-fight-back/
  2. Mandiant M-Trends 2015, https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf
  3. Command Line Kung Fu Episode #31: Remote Command Execution, http://blog.commandlinekungfu.com/2009/05/episode-31-remote-command-execution.html
  4. https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack
  5. https://github.com/darkoperator/Posh-VirusTotal
  6. https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/public-api/
  7. http://blog.securityonion.net/2017/09/elastic-stack-alpha-release-and.html
  8. https://github.com/philhagen/sof-elk
  9. https://nxlog.co/products/nxlog-enterprise-edition
  10. https://github.com/williballenthin/python-evtx
  11. https://github.com/libyal/libevtx

Sunday, April 16, 2017

ShadowBrokers PCAPs, etc.

I spent some time enjoying Easter Sunday by analyzing the Shadowbrokers EternalBlue attacks vs. a Windows 7 system. It is a service-side attack vs. TCP port 445. On Monday I analyzed EternalRomance and DoublePulsar.

I will update this post as I test other exploits and victim operating systems.

EternalBlue is the 2017 version of MS08-067, which was the last universal service-side vulnerability in Windows systems. EternalRomance is a similar SMB exploit.

I created EternalBlue PCAPs showing successful compromise vs. an unpatched system, reconnecting to a previously-infected system (using DoublePulsar), plus failed compromise vs. a patched system. I just added successful EternalRomance exploits.

PCAPs are here: https://cyber.gd/shadowbrokers

Includes:
  • eternalromance-success-2008r2.pcap (new)
  • eternalromance-doublepulsar-meterpreter.pcap (new)
  • eternalblue-success-unpatched-win7.pcap
  • eternalblue-failed-patched-win7.pcap
  • doublepulsar-backdoor-connect-win7.pcap
VirusTotal PCAP analysis (Includes both Snort and Suricata alerts):
I confirmed that MS17-010 mitigates this attack. Patch now!

Default Windows event logging shows nothing. Neither EMET nor Applocker stopped EternalBlue.

Promising Wireshark display filters to detect EternalBlue (unconfirmed; there may be false positives):
  • EternalBlue: smb.mid == 65
  • DoublePulsar: smb.mid == 81
I disabled SMB1 on Windows 7, which stopped EternalBlue with default settings. I need to test more since EternalBlue can allegedly use SMB2. EternalRomance appears to be SMB1-only.

SMB1 is awful, and should be disabled regardless (be sure to test).

It appears Windows 2003 and XP will be vulnerable forever, barring a change in policy by Microsoft.

DoublePulsar is the backdoor (which listens via SMB or RDP) installed by both EternalBlue and EternalRomance. It allows you to inject other DLLs or code. I used it to inject Metasploit's Meterpreter payload, which will probably be a common approach once attacks take off in the wild.