The Perimeter is Dead

Here's a copy of my SANS CDI Keynote The Perimeter is Dead.

Build it Once, Build it Right: Architecting for Detection

Here's a copy of my Tactical Detection & Data Analytics Summit & Training 2018 keynote: Build it Once, Build it Right

SANS Blue Team Summit

Here is a copy of my SANS Blue Team Summit talk Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

Copy of my #SANS2018 keynote talk:

Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

DerbyCon 7: DeepBlueCLIv2 Talk and links

Here's a link to my DerbyCon 7 talk: Introducing DeepBlueCLI v2, Now Available in PowerShell and Python

Viedo of my talk (thank you: Adrian Crenshaw): http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t205-introducing-deepbluecli-v2-now-available-in-powershell-and-python-eric-conrad

DeepBlueCLI GitHub site: https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI

Last year's talk: http://www.ericconrad.com/2016/09/deepbluecli-powershell-module-for-hunt.html



References:

1. Deconstructing Petya: how it spreads and how to fight back, https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2017/06/28/deconstructing-petya-how-it-spreads-and-how-to-fight-back/
2. Mandiant M-Trends 2015, https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf
3. Command Line Kung Fu Episode #31: Remote Command Execution, http://blog.commandlinekungfu.com/2009/05/episode-31-remote-command-execution.html
4. https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack
5. https://github.com/darkoperator/Posh-VirusTotal
6. https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/public-api/
7. http://blog.securityonion.net/2017/09/elastic-stack-alpha-release-and.html
8. https://github.com/philhagen/sof-elk
9. https://nxlog.co/products/nxlog-enterprise-edition
10. https://github.com/williballenthin/python-evtx
11. https://github.com/libyal/libevtx

ShadowBrokers PCAPs, etc.

I spent some time enjoying Easter Sunday by analyzing the Shadowbrokers EternalBlue attacks vs. a Windows 7 system. It is a service-side attack vs. TCP port 445. On Monday I analyzed EternalRomance and DoublePulsar.

I will update this post as I test other exploits and victim operating systems.

EternalBlue is the 2017 version of MS08-067, which was the last universal service-side vulnerability in Windows systems. EternalRomance is a similar SMB exploit.

I created EternalBlue PCAPs showing successful compromise vs. an unpatched system, reconnecting to a previously-infected system (using DoublePulsar), plus failed compromise vs. a patched system. I just added successful EternalRomance exploits.

PCAPs are here: https://cyber.gd/shadowbrokers

Includes:

• eternalromance-success-2008r2.pcap (new)
• eternalromance-doublepulsar-meterpreter.pcap (new)
• eternalblue-success-unpatched-win7.pcap
• eternalblue-failed-patched-win7.pcap
• doublepulsar-backdoor-connect-win7.pcap

VirusTotal PCAP analysis (Includes both Snort and Suricata alerts):

• EternalBlue successful compromise
• DoublePulsar backdoor

I confirmed that MS17-010 mitigates this attack. Patch now!

Default Windows event logging shows nothing. Neither EMET nor Applocker stopped EternalBlue.

Promising Wireshark display filters to detect EternalBlue (unconfirmed; there may be false positives):

• EternalBlue: smb.mid == 65
• DoublePulsar: smb.mid == 81

I disabled SMB1 on Windows 7, which stopped EternalBlue with default settings. I need to test more since EternalBlue can allegedly use SMB2. EternalRomance appears to be SMB1-only.

SMB1 is awful, and should be disabled regardless (be sure to test).

It appears Windows 2003 and XP will be vulnerable forever, barring a change in policy by Microsoft.

DoublePulsar is the backdoor (which listens via SMB or RDP) installed by both EternalBlue and EternalRomance. It allows you to inject other DLLs or code. I used it to inject Metasploit's Meterpreter payload, which will probably be a common approach once attacks take off in the wild.

Quality not Quantity talk, commands, and links

Quality not Quantity: Continuous Monitoring's  Deadliest Events

Commands:

Search service creation events and errors:

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname='system'; id=7045,7030}

User creation events and users added to local and global security-enabled group:

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; ID=4720,4732,4728}

Full command line of all processes (requires https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3004375):

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname="Security"; ID=4688}

AppLocker Events (requires AppLocker):

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashTable @{LogName="Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL"; ID=8003,8004}

Detect when EMET blocks malware (requires EMET):

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="application"; ProviderName="EMET"; id=2}

References:

1. Mandiant M-Trends 2016: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/Mtrends2016.pdf
2. Verizon DBIR: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/
3. USENIX Enigma 2016 - NSA TAO Chief on Disrupting Nation State Hackers https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDJb8WOJYdA
4. Neiman Marcus Hackers Set Off 60,000 Alerts While Bagging Credit Card Data: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-21/neiman-marcus-hackers-set-off-60-000-alerts-while-bagging-credit-card-data
5. The ASD 35 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions: http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/top-mitigations/mitigations-2014-table.htm
6. Patch-crazy Aust Govt fought off EVERY hacker since 2013 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/02/patchcrazy_aust_govt_fought_off_every_hacker_since_2013/
7. CIS Critical Security Controls: https://www.cisecurity.org/critical-controls/download.cfm?f=CSC-MASTER-VER%206.0%20CIS%20Critical%20Security%20Controls%2010.15.2015
8. AppLocker: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/mt431813(v=vs.85).aspx
9. AppLocker CSP: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn920019(v=vs.85).aspx
10. Windows 10 Enterprise 90-day Trial: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise
11. Microsoft EMET: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2458544
12. Enable Windows command-line auditing: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3004375 
13. Windows Commands Abused by Attackers http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/.s/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html