CISSP Cram Session

Here are the slides for my CISSP Cram Session webcast.



The webcast is available here: http://sans.org/u/140g

BSides Halifax

Here's a link to my BSides Halifax talk Threat Hunting via DNS

Here's a link to my SANS Miami 2020 keynote talk:

Threat Hunting via Sysmon

Maine DEFCON 207

Here's a copy of my DEFCON 207 talk Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

DeepBlueCLI GitHub site: https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI

Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

Here's a copy of my SANS Security West keynote Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

Here's a copy of my Atlantic Security Conference talk: Build it Once, Build it Right: Architecting for Detection

The Perimeter is Dead

Here's a copy of my SANS CDI Keynote The Perimeter is Dead.

Build it Once, Build it Right: Architecting for Detection

Here's a copy of my Tactical Detection & Data Analytics Summit & Training 2018 keynote: Build it Once, Build it Right

SANS Blue Team Summit

Here is a copy of my SANS Blue Team Summit talk Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

Copy of my #SANS2018 keynote talk:

Threat Hunting via Windows Event Logs

DerbyCon 7: DeepBlueCLIv2 Talk and links

Here's a link to my DerbyCon 7 talk: Introducing DeepBlueCLI v2, Now Available in PowerShell and Python

Viedo of my talk (thank you: Adrian Crenshaw): http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t205-introducing-deepbluecli-v2-now-available-in-powershell-and-python-eric-conrad

DeepBlueCLI GitHub site: https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI

Last year's talk: http://www.ericconrad.com/2016/09/deepbluecli-powershell-module-for-hunt.html



References:

1. Deconstructing Petya: how it spreads and how to fight back, https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2017/06/28/deconstructing-petya-how-it-spreads-and-how-to-fight-back/
2. Mandiant M-Trends 2015, https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf
3. Command Line Kung Fu Episode #31: Remote Command Execution, http://blog.commandlinekungfu.com/2009/05/episode-31-remote-command-execution.html
4. https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack
5. https://github.com/darkoperator/Posh-VirusTotal
6. https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/public-api/
7. http://blog.securityonion.net/2017/09/elastic-stack-alpha-release-and.html
8. https://github.com/philhagen/sof-elk
9. https://nxlog.co/products/nxlog-enterprise-edition
10. https://github.com/williballenthin/python-evtx
11. https://github.com/libyal/libevtx

ShadowBrokers PCAPs, etc.

I spent some time enjoying Easter Sunday by analyzing the Shadowbrokers EternalBlue attacks vs. a Windows 7 system. It is a service-side attack vs. TCP port 445. On Monday I analyzed EternalRomance and DoublePulsar.

I will update this post as I test other exploits and victim operating systems.

EternalBlue is the 2017 version of MS08-067, which was the last universal service-side vulnerability in Windows systems. EternalRomance is a similar SMB exploit.

I created EternalBlue PCAPs showing successful compromise vs. an unpatched system, reconnecting to a previously-infected system (using DoublePulsar), plus failed compromise vs. a patched system. I just added successful EternalRomance exploits.

PCAPs are here: https://cyber.gd/shadowbrokers

Includes:

• eternalromance-success-2008r2.pcap (new)
• eternalromance-doublepulsar-meterpreter.pcap (new)
• eternalblue-success-unpatched-win7.pcap
• eternalblue-failed-patched-win7.pcap
• doublepulsar-backdoor-connect-win7.pcap

VirusTotal PCAP analysis (Includes both Snort and Suricata alerts):

• EternalBlue successful compromise
• DoublePulsar backdoor

I confirmed that MS17-010 mitigates this attack. Patch now!

Default Windows event logging shows nothing. Neither EMET nor Applocker stopped EternalBlue.

Promising Wireshark display filters to detect EternalBlue (unconfirmed; there may be false positives):

• EternalBlue: smb.mid == 65
• DoublePulsar: smb.mid == 81

I disabled SMB1 on Windows 7, which stopped EternalBlue with default settings. I need to test more since EternalBlue can allegedly use SMB2. EternalRomance appears to be SMB1-only.

SMB1 is awful, and should be disabled regardless (be sure to test).

It appears Windows 2003 and XP will be vulnerable forever, barring a change in policy by Microsoft.

DoublePulsar is the backdoor (which listens via SMB or RDP) installed by both EternalBlue and EternalRomance. It allows you to inject other DLLs or code. I used it to inject Metasploit's Meterpreter payload, which will probably be a common approach once attacks take off in the wild.

Quality not Quantity talk, commands, and links

Quality not Quantity: Continuous Monitoring's  Deadliest Events

Commands:

Search service creation events and errors:

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname='system'; id=7045,7030}

User creation events and users added to local and global security-enabled group:

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; ID=4720,4732,4728}

Full command line of all processes (requires https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3004375):

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname="Security"; ID=4688}

AppLocker Events (requires AppLocker):

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashTable @{LogName="Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL"; ID=8003,8004}

Detect when EMET blocks malware (requires EMET):

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="application"; ProviderName="EMET"; id=2}

References:

1. Mandiant M-Trends 2016: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/Mtrends2016.pdf
2. Verizon DBIR: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/
3. USENIX Enigma 2016 - NSA TAO Chief on Disrupting Nation State Hackers https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDJb8WOJYdA
4. Neiman Marcus Hackers Set Off 60,000 Alerts While Bagging Credit Card Data: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-21/neiman-marcus-hackers-set-off-60-000-alerts-while-bagging-credit-card-data
5. The ASD 35 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions: http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/top-mitigations/mitigations-2014-table.htm
6. Patch-crazy Aust Govt fought off EVERY hacker since 2013 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/02/patchcrazy_aust_govt_fought_off_every_hacker_since_2013/
7. CIS Critical Security Controls: https://www.cisecurity.org/critical-controls/download.cfm?f=CSC-MASTER-VER%206.0%20CIS%20Critical%20Security%20Controls%2010.15.2015
8. AppLocker: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/mt431813(v=vs.85).aspx
9. AppLocker CSP: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn920019(v=vs.85).aspx
10. Windows 10 Enterprise 90-day Trial: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise
11. Microsoft EMET: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2458544
12. Enable Windows command-line auditing: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3004375 
13. Windows Commands Abused by Attackers http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/.s/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html

DeepBlueCLI: a PowerShell Module for Hunt Teaming via Windows Event Logs

Here's a video of my 2016 DerbyCon talk DeepBlueCLI. Thank you, @irongeek_adc

A copy of my 2016 DerbyCon talk DeepBlueCLI slides:



Github site: https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI

Link to my Quality Not Quantity talk, which inspired DeepBlueCLI.

C2 Phone Home: Leveraging SecurityOnion to Identify Command and Control Channels

Video of the talk

Links from my Security Onion Con 2016 talk:

C2 Phone Home: Leveraging SecurityOnion to Identify Command and Control Channels

Link to all pcaps, Bro logs and Whitecap Snort Rules

Time is on your Side talk and links

Time is on you Side: Username guessing via Timing Attacks

Links from the talk:

• Eddy Harari's "opensshd - user enumeration" post to the Full Disclosure Mailing List: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Jul/51
• enumer8-ssh: https://github.com/eric-conrad/enumer8
• First names from the 1990 US Census: http://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/1990surnames/
• Last names from the 2000 US Census: http://www.census.gov/topics/population/genealogy/data/2000_surnames.html
• Account Enumeration via Timing Attacks https://littlemaninmyhead.wordpress.com/2015/07/26/account-enumeration-via-timing-attacks/
• Password Spraying Outlook Web Access – How to Gain Access to Domain Credentials Without Being on a Target’s Network: Part 2 http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4694
• Question: What Can I Learn from Password Spraying a 2FA Microsoft Web App Portal?http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=5089

Quality not Quantity talk, commands, and links

Quality not Quantity: Continuous Monitoring's  Deadliest Events

Commands:

Search service creation events and errors:

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname='system'; id=7045,7030}

User creation events and users added to local and global security-enabled group:

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; ID=4720,4732,4728}

Full command line of all processes (requires https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3004375):

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname="Security"; ID=4688}

AppLocker Events (requires AppLocker):

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashTable @{LogName="Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL"; ID=8003,8004}

Detect when EMET blocks malware (requires EMET):

PS> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="application"; ProviderName="EMET"; id=2}

References:

1. Mandiant M-Trends 2016: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/Mtrends2016.pdf
2. Verizon DBIR: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/
3. USENIX Enigma 2016 - NSA TAO Chief on Disrupting Nation State Hackers https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDJb8WOJYdA
4. Neiman Marcus Hackers Set Off 60,000 Alerts While Bagging Credit Card Data: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-21/neiman-marcus-hackers-set-off-60-000-alerts-while-bagging-credit-card-data
5. The ASD 35 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions: http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/top-mitigations/mitigations-2014-table.htm
6. Patch-crazy Aust Govt fought off EVERY hacker since 2013 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/02/patchcrazy_aust_govt_fought_off_every_hacker_since_2013/
7. CIS Critical Security Controls: https://www.cisecurity.org/critical-controls/download.cfm?f=CSC-MASTER-VER%206.0%20CIS%20Critical%20Security%20Controls%2010.15.2015
8. AppLocker: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/mt431813(v=vs.85).aspx
9. AppLocker CSP: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn920019(v=vs.85).aspx
10. Windows 10 Enterprise 90-day Trial: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise
11. Microsoft EMET: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2458544
12. Enable Windows command-line auditing: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3004375 
13. Windows Commands Abused by Attackers http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/.s/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html

CISSP Study Guide 3E - Shipping Now

Just a note to say the CISSP Study Guide 3E is in stock and shipping from Amazon.

http://www.amazon.com/CISSP-Study-Guide-Third-Conrad/dp/0128024372

Electronic editions should be available in January. We are working on the 11th Hour CISSP Study Guide update now, chapters are due by April (but I hope to have it done before then).

CISSP Study Guide 3E is Complete

Lots of people have asked me for the release date of the CISSP Study Guide 3E. Amazon (now) lists December 29th, but it will be sooner.

I can confirm the book done and is at the printers now. I ordered copies as a surprise Christmas gift for students of my MGT 414 class coming up at SANS CDI in 3 weeks, and Syngress has confirmed the books will ship by then.

https://www.sans.org/event/cyber-defense-initiative-2015/course/sans-plus-s-training-program-cissp-certification-exam

MGT 414 and CISSP Study Guide Third Edition

ISC2 recently updated the CISSP® exam, effective April 15th 2015. The biggest change: they went from 10 to 8 domains.

SANS MGT 414 has been fully updated:

Course authors Eric Conrad and Seth Misenar have revised MGT414 to take into account the 2015 updates to the CISSP® exam and prepare students to navigate all types of questions included in the new version. 

MGT414 focuses solely on the 8 domains of knowledge as determined by (ISC)2 that form a critical part of CISSP® exam. Each domain of knowledge is dissected into its critical components, and those components are then discussed in terms of their relationship with one another and with other areas of information security.

We are also working on the CISSP® Study Guide Third Edition. It is due out in November 2015. We will update the Eleventh Hour CISSP Study Guide after that.

I have received a lot of questions regarding CISSP® Study Guide version 2E (and other books that predate this update). Here's ISC2's take:

Q: Since the CISSP has changed from 10 to 8 domains, was some content deleted?
A: No. Content was not removed from the exam and/or training material, but rather refreshed and reorganized to include the most current information and best practices relevant to the global information security industry.

So all of the CISSP® Study Guide Second Edition material still applies, but new concepts have been added. See the CISSP® 2015 Candidate Information Bulletin for specific details on the testable topics. Here's Clement Dupuis' take on cccure.training.

Clement also has a fantastic guide to the changes (with links to online sources of new material).